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USING WESTERN LAW TO IMPROVE CHINA’S
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: OF
TAKEOVERS AND SECURITIES FRAUD
Guanghua Yu*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1978, the Chinese Government has tried various means, such
as using Western law, to improve the inefficiency of State-owned
enterprises (“SOEs”). Despite these efforts, the poor performance of
SOEs at the macro-level has persisted.1 However, the source of the poor
performance remains less clear. The proper question is, “If a privately
owned firm is socialized, and nothing else changes, how will the
ownership change alone affect the firm’s behavior?”2 The question of
ownership change is further complicated because government in
industry is often associated with the suppression of competition, making
it problematic as to whether public ownership or the suppression of
competition is driving poor performance. 3 Research in the property
rights tradition4 and agency costs tradition5 suggests that there will be
performance differences between government and private ownership
because of a broad menu of monitoring mechanisms associated with
private ownership. The underlying premise is that “[b]ehavior under
public and private ownership is different because even with the same

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong and Guest Professor,
Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics; S.J.D., University of Toronto, 1996; J.D.,
University of Toronto, 1993; LL. M., Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1988; B.A.,
Shanghai Maritime University, 1985.
1
Gang Fan & Wing Thye Woo, State Enterprise Reform as a Source of Macroeconomic
Instability: The Case of China, 10 ASIAN ECON. J. 207 (1996) (arguing that SOEs were an
important contributing factor of macroeconomic instability); see WORLD BANK, THE CHINESE
ECONOMY: FIGHTING INFLATION, DEPENDING REFORMS 15-7 (1996); WORLD BANK, CHINA’S
MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISE ASSETS: THE STATE AS SHAREHOLDER (1997).
2
Sam Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the United
States, 14 J. L. & ECON. 109, 110 (1971).
3
Scott E. Atkinson & Robert Halvorsen, The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Firms
in a Regulated Environment: The Case of U.S. Electric Utilities, 29 J. PUB ECON. 281 (1986).
4
See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demestz, Production, Information, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
5
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
*
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explicit organizational goals, the costs-rewards system impinging upon
the employees and the ‘owners’ of the organization are different.”6
Different results were found after studying a sample of nationalized
companies in Japan and Germany in which the U.S. government held
thirty-five to one hundred percent of the outstanding common shares
between one and twenty-three years during and following World War
II. 7 The study indicated that the economic performance of the
government-owned companies was not significantly different than that
of private-sector firms in the same industry. 8 Hence, the interim
government custodianship of the firms in the study did not cause the
effects normally attributed to government ownership. The study has
limitations, however. First, the firms in the sample were subject to
interim custodianship by the U.S. government rather than full-fledged
government ownership. Second, the firms in the sample were eventually
reprivatized. Third, the study did not have enough degrees of freedom
to calibrate the relative importance of the monitoring mechanisms such
as competitive markets, monitoring shareholders, and external valuation
faced by the government in that case.
It has also been argued that, in addition to the lack of means to
motivate or discipline agents in public organizations, public actors will
pursue socially undesirable ends because of political self interest.9
This Article focuses, from an agency perspective, on Chinese SOEs
that provide non-public goods or services. However, establishing
various market mechanisms by utilizing Western law to improve the
inefficiency of the SOEs is difficult. This Article argues that China
cannot achieve the goal of using Western law to improve the inefficiency
of SOEs unless the State withdraws or considerably reduces its
ownership in the large number of State-owned listed companies.
After examining the reform of SOEs since 1978, Part II examines the
problems in establishing an efficient market of corporate control despite
transplanting of a Western-type takeover law.10 Part III discusses the
Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, in ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK
127-149 (1977).
7
Stacey R. Kole & J. Harold Mulherin, The Government as a Shareholder: A Case from the
United States, 30 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1997).
8
Id.
9
Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2003).
10
See infra Part II.
6
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wide-spread existence of securities fraud in the issuing of shares in Stateowned listed companies.11 While focusing on the difficulty of enforcing
a Western-type securities law to show the inefficiency in the public
provision of goods or services, this Article also raises the doubts on
Martha Minow’s call for a public framework of accountability to be
discussed in Part III.C.12 If a public framework of accountability cannot
be developed to deal with the abuse in SOEs, it is unlikely that such a
framework will be very useful for private companies in market
economies.13 This Article concludes that the political goal of maintaining
control of large SOEs in China makes it difficult to establish efficient
market mechanisms or legal means to motivate or discipline agents in
China’s SOEs.14 Further, this Article concludes that inefficient market or
legal mechanisms adversely affect the performance of SOEs in China’s
transitional economy.15
II. THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S SOES AND THE LAW OF TAKEOVERS
Although the reform of SOEs started in 1978, the performance of
SOEs and banks remained poor in the 1980s and at the beginning of the
1990s.
In 1987, losses incurred by State-owned, economicallyindependent, industrial enterprises amounted to 6.1 billion yuan. 16
These losses increased to 34.8 billion yuan in 1990, and to 45.2 billion
yuan in 1993.17 During the first four months of 1994, 50.1% of these
enterprises were running at a loss. 18 Despite slight performance
improvements during the latter half of 1994, 34.4% of these SOEs were
still running at a loss by the end of 1994.19 Overstocking products, chain
defaulting of loans, and poor funds management had taken an
increasingly heavier toll on the economic performance of enterprises.
For instance, stockpiled products accounted for the loss of 412.4 billion

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.C (discussing Minow’s public framework of accountability).
13
While the contractual and market mechanisms that can be used to motivate or
discipline agents in companies include the capital, takeover, product, and managerial
markets, shareholder monitoring, and creditor monitoring, this Article only examines
takeover and capital markets.
14
See infra Part IV.
15
See infra Part IV.
16
Project Group for the Establishment of a Modern Enter. Sys., Several Problems Related to
the Establishment of a Modern Enterprise System, SOC. SC. P.R.C. 19, 20 (Winter 1996). One
U.S. dollar roughly equals 8.2 Chinese yuan.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
11
12
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yuan at the end of 1994.20 Most of these unpaid loans were used by
medium to large-sized SOEs.
Despite the reform of the financial sector, performance of banks
remained poor at the beginning of the 1990s. Overdue payments and
non-performing loans were high. While official reports indicated that
overdue payments and non-performing loans accounted for fifteen
percent of all credit offered by banks in 1992, 21 unofficial estimates
showed that overdue payments and non-performing loans were close to
forty percent of all outstanding loans. 22 The dominant means of
financing SOEs through loans from State banks generated political risks
when banks were unable to tighten the soft budget constraints of various
loan users.23
Soft budget constraints, and the legal prohibition against banks from
owning shares in non-financial companies, required the use of
alternative means of financing corporate activities. The stock market
was a natural selection. It has been argued that if the share system were
adopted, worker-owners would have greater incentives to improve their
enterprises. 24 It is also believed that stock market mechanisms were
more efficient at rationalizing productive assets than the intermingling of
government administration and enterprise management. 25 Moreover,
the creation of a stock market would give enterprises more financial
responsibility since the worker-investors would have to bear the cost of
losses from the beginning. 26 China’s company law and stock market
were, therefore, mainly designed to improve the performance of
inefficient SOEs. 27 The takeover market, the market for corporate
control, is sometimes claimed to be able to discipline inefficient
Id.
Zhou Zhengqing, “Explanations Concerning the Commercial Banking Law of the PRC,” a
Speech Delivered at the Ninth Session of the Eighth Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress on August 24, 1994, GAZETTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 19, 20-21 (May 30, 1995).
22
Interview with Mr. Cai, a middle level manager with the Bank of China, in Hangzhou,
China (May 25, 1993).
23
See Guanghua Yu, The Relevance of Comparative Corporate Governance Studies for China, 8
AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 49, 79-80 (1997) (discussing the difficulty of enforcing the Bankruptcy
Law in China in the 1990s). See generally JANOS KORNAI, ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE (D.W.
Jorgenson et al. eds. 1980) (discussing soft budget constraints).
24
See Xu Jing’an, The State-Share System: A New Avenue for China’s Economic Reform, 11 J.
COMP. ECON. 509, 510 (1987).
25
Id. at 513.
26
Id.
27
Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the
People’s Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 273, 307 (1995).
20
21
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managers and improve the allocation of productive resources. It is yet to
be seen whether the use of an English-style takeover law will achieve
such discipline and allocation.
A. The Use of an English-Style Takeover Law
China’s early takeover transactions were regulated by the Tentative
Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Shares
(“ITS”).28 In the ITS, provisions on takeovers were very similar to the
Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers,29 which was itself based on
the London City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.30 Despite only seven
articles on takeovers in the ITS, the key provision, Article 48, is based on
the London City Code.31 According to Article 48:
[W]ithin 45 working days after any legal person’s (other
than a promoter’s) direct or indirect holding of
outstanding common shares in a listed company reaches
30% of such company’s total outstanding common
shares, such legal person shall make an offer of takeover
to all the shareholders of such company, offering to
purchase their shares through [cash] payment.32
If a takeover is made, the higher of the following two prices should
be adopted as the offer price: “(1) the highest price paid by the offeror for
purchase of such shares during the 12 months preceeding the issuance of
the takeover offer; [or] (2) the average market price of such shares during
the 30 working days preceeding the issuance of the takeover offer.”33 I
will call this provision the mandatory purchase provision.34

CHINA L. & PRAC. at 23 (August 1993) (providing an English translation of the ITS).
The Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong, (P.R.C.), at http://www.hksfc.
org.hk (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
30
The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Rules Governing Substantial
Acquisitions of Shares (U.K.), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (last visited
Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter London City Code].
31
Id. art. 9.1.
32
CHINA L. & PRAC., supra note 28, at 34 (art. 48). SOEs and companies are legal persons,
but branches and partnerships are not legal persons in Chinese law. A legal person shall
have the following qualifications: (1) establishment in accordance with the law; (2)
possession of the necessary property or funds; (3) possession of its own name,
organization, and premises; and (4) ability to independently bear civil liability. The General
Principles of Civil Law (art. 37), in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 225
(Foreign Languages Press 1987) (art. 37) [hereinafter General Principles].
33
General Principles, supra note 32, at 225. The current price provision in the Procedures
on the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies issued by the China Securities
28
29
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A few other provisions are related to the fair treatment of minority
shareholders and are much easier to justify. For instance, Article 50
states that “[a]ll the conditions contained in a takeover offer shall apply
to all the holders of the same kind of shares.” 35 Article 51 further
clarifies that “[i]f the total number of shares that [offeror] offers to buy is
less than the total number of shares for which the offer is preliminarily
accepted, the offeror shall purchase such shares from the preliminarily
accepting offeree [shareholders] on a pro rata basis.”36 Article 52 states:
In the event of a change in any of the main conditions of
offer after a takeover offer has been issued, the offeror
shall promptly notify all offerees. Such notification may
be made in the form of a press conference or newspaper
announcement or by another means of dissemination.
During the term of a takeover offer and for a period of
30 working days thereafter, the offeror may not
purchase the shares in question on any conditions other
than those set forth in the offer.37
Still other provisions are related to disclosure and the facilitation of
potential competing takeover offers. Article 47 states that if a legal
person holds, pursuant to the disclosure provision, directly or indirectly,
more than five percent of the common shares of another listed company,
a public announcement shall be made and a written report disclosing the
fact shall be sent to the listed target company, the relevant stock
exchange, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”)
within three working days from the date of acquisition.38 In addition,
Article 47 states that any change of the above acquired shares of such a
legal person reaching two percent will again trigger the reporting duty.39
Such a legal person shall not directly or indirectly buy or sell shares of
the target company within two working days from the announcement
Regulatory Commission on September 28, 2002, follows the higher of the highest price the
acquirer paid during the six months prior to the date of public announcement, or ninety
percent of the arithmetic mean of the daily weighted average prices of the target company’s
listed shares of that class during the thirty days prior to the date of public announcement.
Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies Procedures, CHINA L. & PRAC. 43 (Nov.
2002) [hereinafter Administration].
34
See infra Part II.B (discussing the mandatory purchase provision).
35
CHINA L. & PRAC., supra note 28, at 34 (art. 50).
36
Id. at 35 (art. 51).
37
Id. (art. 52).
38
Id. at 33-34 (art. 47).
39
Id. at 34 (art. 47). The current position is five percent pursuant to the Securities Act of
1998 instead of two percent.
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date and before the submission of the report.40 According to Article 49,
aimed at facilitating takeover offers, the takeover offer period, calculated
from the offer-issuing date, shall not be less than thirty working days,
and offerors shall not withdraw their takeover offers during the offer
period. 41 Furthermore, Article 53 states that the offeree shareholders
have the right to withdraw their acceptances at any time during the offer
period.42 As will be discussed later, the political goal of maintaining
control over the large SOEs has made the disclosure provision and the
provision for facilitating competing takeover offers irrelevant in the
1990s.43
B. Mandatory Purchase Provisions
The mandatory purchase provision is a special feature of the
English-style takeover law. U.S. takeover law does not have such a
provision. The rationale behind the mandatory purchase provision is
equality in the treatment of minority shareholders. If an acquiring
company pays a premium to the majority, block, or some shareholder(s)
in a target when purchasing their shares, the acquiring company will
also be required to extend the same premium to the minority
shareholders in the target company. An introductory provision in the
London City Code reflects this policy concern. Section 1(a) stipulates
that the Code is “designed principally to ensure fair and equal treatment
of all shareholders in relation to takeovers.”44 This rationale, however, is
based on an unrealistic assumption that whatever the law, the number of
takeovers will not be reduced. The provision takes the ex post view that
the gains from takeovers should be shared equally by all the
shareholders in the target once a takeover occurs.45
The mandatory purchase provision can be evaluated by the
autonomy value and the welfare value. Neither criterion can justify this
premium sharing provision. From a Nozickian rights-based approach, a

Id. (art. 47).
Id. (art. 49).
42
Id. at 35 (art. 52).
43
See infra Part IV.
44
London City Code, available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (last visited
Oct. 28, 2004).
45
See Gregg Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since
1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988); Michael Jensen & Richard Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (providing empirical evidence that
takeovers are more likely to produce social gains).
40
41
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distinction is made between threats and offers. 46 Threats reduce the
possibilities open to the recipient of a proposal, whereas offers expand
them. Threats are therefore coercive, while offers are not. From that
perspective, takeovers would seem properly viewed as offers rather than
as threats. The possibility of having a new management team indicates
that takeovers increase target shareholders’ possibilities relative to their
positions prior to their interactions with the acquirer.
Without
takeovers, shareholders in target companies may stay with these
companies while the company stagnates or simply dies from insolvency.
Even the threat of takeovers disciplines managers in a potential target
company.
Despite the conclusion that takeover transactions enlarge
shareholders’ contractual possibilities, and despite the overwhelming
empirical evidence that shareholders of target companies receive
abnormal returns resulting from takeover transactions, an enormous
body of academic writing has focused on the problem of coercion in
takeovers, particularly in partial bids. 47 It has been noted that
“demonstrated examples of coercion remain as rare as confirmed
sightings of the Loch Ness monster.”48 The ex ante Nozickian rightsbased approach provides little justification for the mandatory purchase
provision. 49 If takeovers enlarge the opportunities of the target
shareholders, as they are considered offers rather than threats,
mandatory purchase provisions cannot be justified. Even from the
perspective of the remaining target shareholders, mandatory purchase
provisions may reduce contractual opportunities as the heavy burden of
the provision on the acquirer could result in few takeovers ex ante. Ex
post, mandatory purchase provisions may be viewed as offers to
particular offeree shareholders in the target because they can choose to
either sell their shares to the acquirer at a premium or remain in the
target and expect the improvement of the target by the acquirer.
Mandatory purchase provisions, however, are certainly threats to the
shareholders in the acquiring company. If takeovers do not create third
party effects of coercion on the remaining shareholders in the target, it is
46
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 447, 447-453 (Sindey
Morgenbesser et al. eds, 1969).
47
See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1377 (1986); Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983).
48
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stateholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 459.
49
See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing Robert Nozick’s rights-based
philosophy).
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not clear why the contractual relation between the acquirer and part of
the shareholders in the target should be restrained.
Autonomy value—the concept that allowing an individual to freely
determine his own affairs is fundamental and paramount to the moral
enterprise—provides little support for mandatory purchase provisions.50
Likewise, welfare value—the assessment of contractual relationships to
determine whether a contractual arrangement would enhance or reduce
the economic well-being of the contractual parties or third parties to
determine whether government intervention is necessary—would also
oppose the use of the mandatory purchase provision. 51 Mandatory
purchase provisions increase the cost of acquiring the control of target
companies. The harmful effects of the mandatory purchase provision are
obvious. In the first place, mandatory purchase provisions reduce the
number of offers by making targets more expensive to acquire.
According to the economic law of supply and demand, the higher the
price, the lower the demand from purchasers. Lower demand in the
context of takeovers means fewer takeovers, hence, possibly a smaller
pie for society. Second, the philosophy of sharing the gains from
takeover transactions contained in the mandatory purchase provision
reduces the return of investment on the part of the acquirer. The
inability of acquirers to appropriate the full value of their investments
will lead them to undertake too few takeovers.
This is the classic public good problem.52 The proper management
of an inefficient target company is a public good to all the shareholders
of the target. It has also been pointed out “that there are significant costs
in ensuring that directors/managers act in the interest of the
[shareholders]. If one shareholder [acquirer] devotes resources to
improving management, then all shareholders benefit.” 53
The
mandatory purchase provision exacerbates the problem that the costs
will be borne by third parties, or externalities, by allowing even the
remaining shareholders of the target company to equally share takeover
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in The THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW
223-40 (Peter Benson ed. 2001); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 241-68 (1993).
51
TREBILCOCK, supra note 50, at 241-68.
52
See Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 386
(1954) (discussing the nature of public goods).
53
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 59 (1980); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698, 705-706 (1982) (providing a similar
discussion of the problem of freeriders and externality in the context of freezeouts).
50
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gains. This severe externality problem indicates that it cannot be
assumed that a company that is not being run in the interests of
shareholders will always be vulnerable to a takeover bid. An antidote to
this externality problem is to exclude the remaining shareholders in the
target from sharing equal gains resulting from takeovers ex post, hence,
an argument for abolishing the mandatory purchase provision at least at
the low threshold of holding thirty percent of outstanding common
shares.
C. Chinese Stock Exchange
To understand how the imported takeover law adjusts to China’s
local conditions, we need to understand the ownership structure of the
listed companies on the two stock exchanges. As discussed previously,
both the development of China’s corporate law and the establishment of
the stock market at the beginning of the 1990s were closely related to the
reform of SOEs.54 A survey taken in May of 1999 revealed that among
the 862 listed companies on the two stock exchanges, State-shares existed
in 541, or 62.76% of the companies.55 Among the 541 listed companies,
State-shares accounted for 45% of the total issued shares in these
companies.56 In 473 listed companies, the State shareholder had either
absolute or relative control of the company, occupying 87.43% of the 541
listed companies.57 The State-shares were mainly held by State Asset
Administration Bureaus (“SAAB”), State investment companies, or the
parent companies of the State-owned listed companies.58 In 70.79% of
the 541 listed companies, State-shares ranged from thirty to eighty
percent. 59 Different from the shares held by individuals, which are
traded at the two stock exchanges, State-shares and legal-person-shares
of SOEs are not traded on the stock exchanges. Another statistic shows

54
See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text (discussing the development and reform
of the Chinese stock market).
55
Zhang Zongxin & Sun Yewei, The Optimization of Shareholding Structure and the
Improvement of Corporate Governance in Listed Companies, 1 ECON. REV. 36 (2001).
56
Id.
57
Absolute control means that the State controls more than fifty percent of the issued
shares, and relative control means that the State controls more than thirty percent of the
issued shares. Infobank, available at http://www.chinainfobank.com (last visited Oct. 28,
2004); Zhang & Sun, supra note 55.
58
Zhang & Sun, supra note 55, at 36. The percentage of State ownership is much higher
because State ownership may be held by legal persons of State-owned companies. Id.
59
Id.
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that traded shares owned by individual investors in most listed
companies are only between twenty-five to forty percent.60
The structure of shareholding in most listed companies makes it
impossible for an acquiring company to accumulate control through
buying shares on any stock exchange. So far, there has been no
successful acquisition of control of a listed company by purchasing
shares on the stock market. To acquire a sufficient percentage of shares
in a target listed company, instead, requires the purchase of part of the
non-traded shares owned by the State or other companies. This makes
the negotiated takeover the preferred method of takeovers in China.
Under this method, an acquiring company negotiates with a majority or
block shareholder and enters into a share transfer agreement with that
shareholder in the target listed company.
D. Negotiated Takeovers
Negotiated takeovers in China, however, have to overcome some
procedural and legal hurdles. On the procedural side, acquiring Stateowned shares or legal person shares of SOEs requires approval by the
relevant authority. Article 29 of the Provisional Measures on the
Administration of State-Owned Shares of Joint Stock Companies
provides that the transfer of State-owned shares needs the approval of
the SAAB and the provincial government. 61 Transferring more than
thirty percent of the State-owned shares in a listed company requires the
joint approval of the SAAB and the State Economic Restructuring
Commission.62 The approval procedure is consistent with the goal of
maintaining governmental control of large SOEs on the stock market.
In addition to overcoming this procedural hurdle, negotiated
takeovers must comply with the requirement of the mandatory purchase
provision, which is central to the London City Code. The cost of
following such a mandatory purchase provision is well recognized by
regulators in China.63 The practice of dealing with negotiated takeovers
and the adjustment of English-style takeover law to the Chinese takeover
Zhang Rui, A Legal Analysis of Negotiated Takeovers of Listed Companies, JILIN UNIV. J.
SOC. SCIENCES 108, 109 (July 2003).
61
These administrative rules were jointly issued by the SAAB and the State Economic
Restructuring Commission on November 3, 1994. Infobank, available at http://www.china
infobank.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
62
Id.
63
Zhang Xin, Legislation and Regulation of Takeovers of Listed Companies, SEC. MARKET
HERALD, August 2003, at 12.
60
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market reflects the concern that strictly following the mandatory
purchase provision is inefficient.
The first negotiated takeover took place in 1994, under the early
takeover regime. 64 Hengtong Investment, Ltd. (“Hengtong”) was
incorporated in Zuhai in 1981. Focusing on real estate development,
Hengtong also developed in areas of shipping, communications, textiles,
and electronic products. To market its electricity meters in Shanghai,
Hengtong planned to acquire a property development company in
Shanghai. Search efforts revealed that Shanghai Lingguang, Ltd.
(“Lingguang”), which produced glass and electronic components, was a
suitable target. Lingguang issued 33.8 million shares total. Among all
the issued shares, Shanghai Construction, Ltd. held 55.26% of the shares
on behalf of the State, while individual investors and legal person
investors accounted for 32.55% and 11.89% of the shares, respectively.
Shortly before the transfer of control, shares of Lingguang were trading
at around thirteen yuan per share on the secondary market. Hengtong’s
motivations of acquiring a controlling block of Lingguang shares were
twofold. First, Hengtong was motivated mainly to rely on Shanghai
Construction’s connection with the property market in Shanghai.
Secondly, the motivation was partly to take advantage of Lingguang’s
technology. The deal was encouraging news to Lingguang and Shanghai
Construction based on the information then available, as Lingguang was
short of funds to carry out ambitious development projects. An
agreement was reached among Hengtong, Shanghai Construction, and
Lingguang to transfer 35.5% of the shares held by Shanghai Construction
to Hengtong at the price of 4.3 yuan per share on April 28, 1994.
Transferring more than thirty percent of the shares of a target, however,
triggered the mandatory purchase provision. To avoid the high cost of
mandatorily purchasing the remaining shares of Lingguang, Hengtong
applied to the CSRC for an exemption from the mandatory purchase
requirement. The CSRC granted an exemption, mainly on the ground
that the transferred shares were the non-trading, State-owned shares.
The Hengtong case raises a number of questions. Could the CSRC
approve the transfer price of 4.3 yuan per share when the individual
shares traded on the secondary stock market were around thirteen yuan
per share? Is the significant discount of control shareholding able to
ensure that the productive resources of the target would move towards a
more efficient purchaser? Another question is by which legal grounds
CHEN GONG ET AL., EDS, PRINCIPLES AND CASES OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND
TAKEOVERS 421-425 ( Renmin Univ. Press, 1996).
64
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did the CSRC give the exemption from the mandatory purchase
obligation, because the ITS contains no legal provision conferring
discretion upon the CSRC to grant exemptions. The lack of a legal
provision, of course, did not constrain the CSRC when the rule of law
granting exemptions was not deeply entrenched in China. Finally,
should China follow the U.S. approach by exempting the transfer of
control through an agreement under the need of protection test if it is
well recognized that the cost of following the English mandatory
purchase provision is too high?65
E. Developments in Takeover Law
Later development of the takeover law partially addressed the issues
arising from Hengtong. The Securities Law66 modified the mandatory
purchase provision and deliberately gave the CSRC the discretion to
exempt acquirers from following the mandatory purchase requirement if
they acquired shares through any stock exchange. 67 The modified
mandatory purchase provision now provides that if an investor holds
thirty percent of the issued shares of a listed company and continues to
buy such shares through a stock exchange, the investor shall make a
takeover offer to all the shareholders of the listed target company.68 The
Securities Law seems to make a difference with respect to negotiated
takeovers. Article 89 of the Securities Law stipulates:
In the case of takeover by agreement, the [acquirer] may
effect the equity transfer by entering into an agreement
with the shareholders of the target company, as
prescribed in laws and administrative regulations.
When a listed company is taken over by agreement, the
[acquirer] must, within three days after the agreement is
reached, submit a written report on the takeover
agreement to the State Council’s securities regulatory
authority and the stock exchange, and make an
announcement.69

Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1985).
See Securities Laws, CHINA L. & PRAC., at 25 (February 1994) (providing an English
translation of the law promulgated on Dec. 29, 1998, that became effective on July 1, 1999)
[hereinafter Securities Laws].
67
Id. at 42 (art. 81).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 43-44 (art. 89).
65
66
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Article 89 appears to be based on the need of protection test found in
U.S. securities regulation, which is based on the theory that selling shares
by sophisticated investors does not need the protection of the law.70 It is
relatively clear that Article 89 does not expressly compel the acquirer to
make an offer to all the shareholders in a negotiated takeover. Nor does
Article 89 require the acquirer to obtain approval from the CSRC for
such a negotiated takeover, except for the compliance with the reporting
and announcement requirement. Article 89 seems to recognize the high
cost of the mandatory purchase provision and the need of a corporate
control market to improve the inefficient State-owned listed companies.
However, Article 89 has not been used in that way. The CSRC’s position
is that, whatever the method of acquiring control, the mandatory
purchase provision must be complied with unless it has granted the
acquirer a waiver. This position is consistent with the practice of
negotiated takeovers in China: By the end of 2000, 121 negotiated
takeovers had followed the pattern of Hengtong by obtaining a waiver
from the CSRC.71
F. Negotiated Takeovers Reconsidered
As discussed previously, most of China’s SOEs on the stock market
are not very efficient. A study has found that there is a negative
correlation between firm performance and the percentage of Stateowned shares. 72 Empirical evidence in another study suggests that
takeovers in China are largely efficient compared with the status of
many companies before the takeover, although the market could be more
efficient if ideological issues are dealt with properly.73
The inefficiency of the State-owned listed companies and the need of
an active takeover market to facilitate the reallocation of productive
resources requires China to modify the English-style takeover law in the
Chinese takeover environment. This objective has led the CSRC to
reconsider its position on negotiated takeovers. In 2002, the CSRC issued
the Procedures on the Administration of the Takeover of Listed

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978); see
Hanson Trust PLC, 774 F. 2d 47.
71
Li Bingan, A Discussion of the Exemption from the Mandatory Purchase Provision, 18(6)
LEGAL F. 50 (Nov. 2003).
72
He Xiaogang, Management Buyouts: The Status Abroad, Research, and Development in
China, 4 REFORM 54 (2003).
73
Fei Yiwen & Cai Mingchao, An Analysis of the Takeover Effects of Listed Companies on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange, 5 WORLD ECON. 64 (2003).
70
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Companies (“Takeover Procedures”). 74 The Takeover Procedures
reaffirm the position of the CSRC that, whatever the method of acquiring
more than thirty percent of the shares in a target listed company, the
mandatory purchase requirement must be complied with unless
exemption from the CSRC is obtained. 75 However, the Takeover
Procedures have also provided numerous grounds upon which the
CSRC is prepared to grant a waiver.
Some of the waiver exceptions are related to debt restructuring and
insolvency reorganization. For instance, a waiver will be given if the
transfer of shares is applied for on the basis of a court ruling and results
in the percentage of shares held or controlled by the purchaser exceeding
thirty percent of the listed company’s issued shares.76 A waiver will also
be provided if a bank, during the ordinary course of business, has
acquired more than thirty percent of the issued shares of a listed
company, even though the bank has no intention or has taken no action
to actually control such a listed company, and has made arrangements to
transfer the excess shares to non-affiliated parties. 77 An insolvency
waiver is provided to an acquirer that is taking over a listed company in
financial distress in order to rescue it under a proposed and feasible
restructuring plan.78
Other waiver exceptions are based on the ground that no
shareholder in a target listed company has received a takeover premium,
such as when an acquirer accumulates more than thirty percent of the
shares of a listed company resulting from the company’s issuing new
shares.79 Another waiver exception is allowed where the acquisition of
more than thirty percent of the issued shares of a listed company is
caused by the reduction of the capital of the company.80
In the past, the CSRC frequently gave waivers if the administrative
transfer of State-owned shares had caused the transferee to hold or
control more than thirty percent of the issued shares of a listed
company. 81
This exemption remains under the new Takeover
Procedures. Finally, the Takeover Procedures have added a catchall
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Administration, supra note 33, at 43.
Id. at 45-46 (arts. 13-14, 23).
Id. at 56 (art. 49(4)).
Id. (art. 51(4)).
Id. at 55 (art. 49(2)).
Id. (art. 49(3)).
Id. at 56 (art. 51(2)).
Id. at 57 (art. 51(5)).
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provision, giving the CSRC the discretion to waive the mandatory
purchase provision if the CSRC considers it necessary to meet the needs
of the development and changes of the securities market and the need to
protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors.82 The transfer of
control through administrative means as practiced in the past has made
the mandatory purchase provision largely irrelevant. If the catch-all
provision is also liberally used, the mandatory purchase provision will
also be made partly irrelevant.
The discussion of the adjustment of the English-style mandatory
purchase provision clearly shows that application of the provision in
China is path-dependent. The political goal of maintaining control of the
State-owned listed companies has completely changed the rationale of
using such a provision. The past socialist system of public ownership of
the means of production created interested parties that controlled both
the political and economic resources. These interested parties will try to
protect their vested rights and interests. An easier way of continuing
their control is to maintain the control of the large State-owned listed
companies. The insistence of this political goal requires a different way
of using the law of takeovers. China’s developing securities market can
be properly understood only in the context of its underlying motivation,
by carefully avoiding the mistake of assuming that adoption of westernstyle structures and laws implies movement toward western goals.83
If we take the ex ante efficiency view discussed previously, the
adjustment of the imported takeover law is very positive in the sense of
achieving the primary goal of improving the large number of
inefficiently run State-owned listed companies. Another positive use of
English-style takeover law is the adoption of non-frustration on the part
of the directors in a target listed company when facing a takeover offer.84
Article 33 of the Takeover Procedures provides that the decisions made
and measures taken by the directors, supervisors and senior
management of the target company with respect to the takeover offer
made by an acquirer may not prejudice the legitimate rights and
interests of the company or its shareholders.85 More specifically, Article
33 prohibits the adoption of measures of issuing new shares or
Id. at 56-57 (arts. 49(5), 51(7)).
Art & Gu, supra note 27.
84
London City Code, available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (last visited Oct.
28, 2004) (General Principle 7).
85
Takeover Procedures, CHINA L. & PRAC. 51-52 (Nov. 2002) (art. 33) [hereinafter Takeover
Procedures].
82
83
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convertible bonds, the repurchase of its own shares, the amendment of
articles of association, and the signing of contracts, which could have a
major effect on the company’s assets, liabilities, rights, interests, or
business outcomes, except in the ordinary course of business, after an
acquirer has announced its takeover intention.86
G. U.S. Takeover Practice
In the United States, controversy surrounds whether the board of
directors or the shareholders should be given the ultimate power to
decide whether the corporation should be sold to a bidder that offers to
buy all the corporation’s shares at a substantial premium above the
current stock market price. Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor
Daniel Fischel argue that management should remain completely passive
in the face of a takeover bid. 87 Their argument is based on the
assumption that most takeovers are efficient in that they discipline
inefficient managers in the target. 88 When inefficient managers are
facing a takeover bid that tends to remove them, it is unlikely that their
action to defeat the takeover will be for the best interest of the target
corporation.89 Professor Lucian Bebchuk argues that, once mechanisms
to ensure undistorted shareholder choice are in place, boards should not
be permitted to block offers beyond the period necessary for putting
together alternatives for shareholder consideration.90 In contrast, Martin
Lipton argues against a regime of shareholders voting and no board
veto.91 According to Lipton, there are significant costs to corporations in
being managed as if they were constantly for sale.92
The Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) takes a middle
ground. The DGCL gives the board of directors a central role in

Id.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
88
Id.
89
See Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. L. STUD.
165 (1988) (providing a similar view as Easterbrook and Fischel). Inefficient managers in
the target company can be disciplined when the acquiring company has taken over the
target and replaced the inefficient managers with efficient and responsible managers. In
other words, the inefficient managers can be disciplined by the loss of their jobs after a
takeover.
90
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 973 (2002).
91
Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002).
92
Id. at 1061-1062.
86
87
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corporate decision-making,93 but it also requires stockholder consent for
many fundamental transactions.94 The DGCL is, however, silent on the
most contentious question in the debate: In what circumstances, and to
what extent, are directors empowered to prevent shareholders from
accepting a tender offer? The Delaware courts also takes a middle
ground. While in principle Delaware case law holds that the purpose of
the corporation is to maximize the wealth of its stockholders,95 Delaware
decisions also give directors substantial authority to deploy the powerful
weapon of a poison pill,96 and to block takeover offers that appear to be
in the best interests of the current array of stockholders.97 The Delaware
courts, however, have subjected defensive measures to a heightened
form of judicial review under which directors must prove the
reasonableness and good faith of their actions.98 The result is a regime in
which directors are given substantial authority to forge corporate
strategies while leaving room for stockholders to vote down
management-preferred directors and to use the election process to avail
themselves of a tender offer.99
The adoption of the English-style mandatory purchase provision at
the beginning of 1990s has educated regulators in China relatively well
on other parts of the London City Code. When the CSRC issued the
Takeover Procedures in 2002, it again chose the English position of nonfrustration over the Delaware-type of takeover law on the proper role of
the target board when the target is facing a takeover offer.100 The choice
for the English-style purchase provision is largely satisfactory in the
context of China for at least two reasons. First, Delaware law is very
complicated. At this stage, regulators and judges in China are still not
sophisticated in takeover law. To expect them to administer the
Delaware-type of takeover law when even the judges in other parts of
the United States are not able to do so is likely to be counterproductive.
Second, directors in the United States are subject to greater constraints by
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001).
See, e.g., id. § 251 (referring to mergers); Id. § 271 (referring to the sale of substantially
all the assets of the firm).
95
See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
96
See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995).
97
See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1990).
98
See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
99
See generally William Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging
the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002) (discussing the theoretical debate on
takeovers in the United States and the current status of Delaware law on takeovers).
100
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
93
94

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/3

Yu: Using Western Law to Improve China's State-Owned Enterprises: Of

2004]

China's State-Owned Enterprises

357

very strict fiduciary duties, derivative suits, and various market
mechanisms that are not available in China.101
H. Negotiated Takeover Defects
While the adoption of English-style takeover law and the adjustment
of the law in China are headed in the right direction, negotiated takeover
transactions have a serious defect. As discussed previously, only shares
held by individuals in listed companies are traded on the two stock
exchanges, while State-shares and legal person shares of SOEs are not
traded on the stock exchanges. This raises the issue of pricing the control
block of State-owned shares. In the Hengtong case, the control block was
priced at 4.3 yuan per share when the shares traded on the stock
exchange were around thirteen yuan per share. 102 The Opinions
Concerning the Exercise of State-Owned Shares in Joint Stock
Companies 103 dictates that the lowest transfer price of State-owned
shares is the net asset value per share.104 In Hengtong and all the other
cases before 2004 when the control block of State-owned shares was
transferred, the price of the shares of the block was several times lower
than the price of the shares traded on the stock market.105 In a few cases,
even the requirement of the lowest transfer price of net asset value per
share is not followed.106
The practice of negotiated takeovers in China also indicates why the
mandatory purchase provision, which is central to the London City
Code, is not followed in China. The mandatory purchase provision is
based on the premise that the acquirer has to extend the same premium
to all other shareholders if he buys shares at a price higher than the
market price from either the majority, block, or some shareholders, that
are more likely to get the benefits because of their positions. This
ensures equality of treatment for all shareholders in the target. In China,
when the control block is priced at a much lower price than the market
price of other shares traded on the stock market, the mandatory
See Zhang Xin, supra note 63 at 15-17 (illustrating the regulator’s view).
CHEN GONG ET. AL, supra note 64.
103
The Opinions Concerning Exercise of State-Owned Shares in Joint Stock Companies, (Aug.
29, 1997) available at http://www.chinainfobank.com/IrisBin/Text.d11?db=FL&no
=11092&cs=102 (providing opinions jointly issued by the SAAB and the State Economic
Restructuring Commission).
104
Id. (Art. 17).
105
CHEN GONG ET AL., supra note 64.
106
An Chunmei & Dou Zhanguo, An Analysis of Benefits and Risks of Management Buyouts
in Listed Companies, 7 FIN. AND ACCT. RES. 52 (2002); Wang Huacheng & Tong Yan,
Management Buyouts in China: The Case of Media, 10 ECON. THEORY AND MGMT. 66 (2002).
101
102
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purchase provision loses its rationale. Obviously, the CSRC and the
government are more interested in the facilitation of the reallocation of
the productive resources of State-owned listed companies, and the
interest of minority shareholders is to a large extent ignored. This again
leads to the conclusion that the political goal of maintaining the control
of State-owned listed companies has made the imported law
considerably irrelevant. While not following the mandatory purchase
provision can be justified on efficiency grounds, the cheap transfer of
control blocks in China has left minority shareholders with no adequate
protection.
In the United States and the United Kingdom, the concern of
takeover law is to ensure minority shareholders a premium over the
market price. Because of the benefits of control, the price of the control
block is normally higher than the price of the shares of a target on the
secondary market. The higher price of the control block is a basic market
mechanism to protect the minority shareholders in that, given the
constraints, only those who are able to manage the target better can
obtain control. There may be mistakes in prediction or judgment on the
part of the acquirer, and the effect of takeover may be disastrous. Yet,
the market in the long run will correct the mistakes. The cheap transfer
of control in China, however, is not able to ensure that acquirers are
necessarily better than the existing management in targets. Furthermore,
the discount of the share price of the control block creates serious risks of
exploiting minority shareholders. In January 2004, the SAAB and the
Ministry of Finance jointly issued the Provisional Measures on the
Administration of the Transfer of State-Owned Shares (“Provisional
Measures”). 107 The Provisional Measures now permit, but do not
compel, the use of auctions or biddings in takeovers in addition to
negotiated takeovers.108 Similar to other administrative rules, however,
the Provisional Measures are more interested in ensuring that the Stateowned assets are not depleted in the low price transfer of control to
private enterprises rather than liberalizing the control of SOEs.
While auctions and biddings in takeovers will alleviate the problem
of cheap transfer of control of listed companies in China, the move
towards an efficient takeover market requires a radical reform of the
large-scale exit of SOEs in many sectors of the economy. SOEs are
unlikely to be efficient as there are no adequate means to motivate the
agents in SOEs or to discipline such agents compared with the means
107
108
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available to private firms.109 If a government is not pursuing the political
goal of maintaining the control of the large listed companies, it is better
to have a competitive takeover market where even private companies are
able to join the competition of acquiring control of some large Stateowned listed companies. The involvement of private companies would
significantly increase opportunities for takeovers of inefficiently run
State-owned listed companies.
The recent case of bidding for control of the Harbin Brewery by two
foreign transnational companies on China’s takeover market provides a
very good example.110 In that case, not only was the price of the takeover
fifty times the earnings of the Harbin Brewery in 2003, but the competing
bidders were making a takeover bid for one hundred percent of the
shares in the target company. It must be acknowledged that this is a
very exceptional case. Only when the government is seriously thinking
of exiting from most listed companies will the regulators pay close
attention to the protection of rights and interests of minority
shareholders in listed companies in China. To realize the goal of
achieving efficiency through corporate law in general and takeover law
in particular, the Chinese Government must abandon the concept of
controlling the State-owned listed companies for the purpose of political
control. Only then can the law of takeover fully realize its efficiency
goal. Currently, the use of an English-type takeover law does not
achieve the goal of improving the inefficiency of SOEs.
III. WEAK ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW ON SECURITIES FRAUD
In a market economy, private companies compete for scarce financial
resources. They obtain capital through retained earnings, new equity, or
debt investment from the capital markets. In a relatively efficient capital
market, the cost of capital formation is lower for good companies than
for bad companies. Competitive discipline requires a company not to
waste resources; if it wastes, retained earnings will disappear and new
investment will not be forthcoming. An efficient capital market not only
requires the law to deal with abuse, but also the threat of using the law
must be credible.
In contrast, public enterprises do not face “hard” budget
constraints.111 Rather, governments have access to capital through their
109
110
111

See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 9.
The Beers Are on Anheuser, THE ECONOMIST, June 5-11, 2004, at 56.
See generally KORNAI, supra note 23 (discussing soft budget constraints).
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taxation powers and may use those monies to fund operations, even if
those operations would not survive in the private setting.112 It has been
pointed out that the risk of using the taxation powers is present when
governments supply goods and services directly or through the vehicle
of SOEs. 113 The lack of discipline on SOEs in the capital market is
another reason that SOEs are far less motivated and efficient than private
companies.
As discussed in Part II, China’s stock market was mainly designed at
the beginning of the 1990s to solve the inefficiency of SOEs, which is why
the State-owned listed companies dominate the two stock exchanges. 114
This section will explain that the privilege China’s SOEs enjoyed in using
the stock market is another form of soft budget constraints. So long as
SOEs do not have to compete with other private or foreign companies for
capital on the stock market, it is unlikely that they will have the same
motivation to maximize profits. When the stock market is also used
politically by the government to maintain control of large SOEs in many
sectors of the economy, it is unlikely that a Western-type of securities
regulation will be strictly enforced. Therefore, this section will also
explain that if a public framework of accountability cannot be developed
to deal with abuses in public companies, it is doubtful whether such a
system can be developed in a cost effective way to curb abuses in private
companies on the market.
A. Cases of Securities Fraud
1.

Chengdu Hong Guang Industrial, Ltd. (“Hong Guang”)

In 1996, Hong Guang applied to the CSRC to list its shares. 115
Despite the fact that the company suffered a loss of Rmb 103 million
yuan, the company claimed that it had a profit of Rmb 54 million yuan.
The company also falsified profit records in 1997 and 1998 after its shares
were listed. In addition to covering the huge losses it suffered, Hong
Guang used 34.3% of the capital raised in listing its shares (Rmb 140
million) to buy and sell shares on the stock market by itself and through
a securities company. Because speculative trading by SOEs and listed
See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 9, at 1429.
William Megginson & Jeffry Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies
on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 331 (2001).
114
See supra Part II.
115
Penalty Decision Regarding the Violation of Securities Regulation by Chengdo Hong Guang
Industrial Ltd., CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICIAL BULLETIN 51 (Oct. 26,
1998), available at http://www.chinainfobank.com.
112
113
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companies was prohibited, 116 the speculative trading of shares was
carried out through the opening of 228 individual trading accounts. As a
matter of fact, Hong Gunag only used 16.5% of the capital raised for the
projects described in its prospectus. Most of the capital raised was
actually used by the company to pay its debts to banks both at home and
abroad. After investigation, the CSRC confiscated Rmb 4.5 million yuan
in illegal trading profits derived from speculative trading, imposed an
administrative fine of Rmb one million yuan, and permanently
prohibited the chairman of the board of directors, the general manager,
and the deputy financial officer from assuming senior officer positions in
listed companies or securities institutions.
Subsequently, the
Intermediate People’s Court of Chengdu sentenced these three people to
jail terms of three years or less. 117 While this was the first case that
criminal liability was imposed on responsible persons in listed
companies, the court refused to hold a trial for the claim of civil liability.
Even though the fraud would be a clear case of the tort of deceit in well
developed common law jurisdictions, and civil liability can also be
grounded on Article 77 of the Provisional Regulation on the
Administration of Issuing and Trading of Shares118 and Article 63 of the
Securities Law,119 the Court justified its decision on the ground that the
loss suffered by investors was not necessarily caused by the fraud.120
2.

Energy 28

Energy 28 falsely claimed to have a profit of Rmb sixteen million
yuan at the time of application for listing its shares and a total profit of
Rmb 211 million yuan during the three years thereafter.121 Furthermore,
the company changed the use of funds as specified in the prospectus in
Measures Concerning the Prohibition of Speculative Trading of Shares by State-Owned
Enterprises and Listing Companies, COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 498 (1997) (issuing
jointly by the State Council Securities Commission, the People’s Bank of China, and the
State Economic and Trade Commission on May 27, 1997).
117
Yao Bei, Hong Guang: The First Case of Criminal Punishment, PEOPLE NET, (Dec. 15,
2000), available at http://www.people.com.cn.
118
COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 480 (1993) (promulgated by the State Council on
April 22, 1993), translated in Securities Regulations, CHINA L. & PRAC. 23 (1993) [hereinafter
Securities Regulations].
119
COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 671 (1998) (enacted by the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress on Dec. 29, 1998), translated in Securities Law, CHINA L. &
PRAC. 25 (February 1999).
120
Yao, supra note 117. It is not clear whether criminal liability would have been
imposed had the responsible persons not used the raised money for speculative trading (a
purely personal act compared with the raising of funds for the company).
121
Luo Xiaoming, CSRC Investigated and Punished Energy 28, PEOPLE NET (Dec. 20, 2000),
available at http://www.people.com.cn.
116
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1996 and in the documents for an additional issue of shares in 1997. As a
result, the CSRC imposed an administrative fine of Rmb one million
yuan on the company, Rmb fifty thousand yuan upon the chairman of
the board of directors, and Rmb thirty thousand yuan upon three other
directors. There were neither criminal proceedings nor civil lawsuits
instituted in this case.
3.

Sanjiu Medical and Pharmaceutical Co. (“Sanjiu”)

During an investigation conducted by the CSRC in June 2001, the
CSRC discovered that the controlling shareholder of Sanjiu improperly
used a total of Rmb 2.5 billion yuan of Sanjiu funds, accounting for
ninety-six percent of Sanjiu’s net assets.122 The board of directors and the
supervisory board of Sanjiu did not support the use of such a large
amount of the listing company’s funds by the controlling shareholder for
a connected transaction. Except for a public criticism by the CSRC,
however, no shareholders’ action was taken against the controlling
shareholder in this case. Lack of clear provisions on derivative actions
by shareholders makes it very difficult for individual shareholders to sue
the wrongdoers that violate provisions either in the Company Law or in
the Articles of Association of Listed Companies.123
4.

Hubei Meierya Co. (“Meierya”)

Improper use of funds by listed companies also occurred in
Meierya.124 In that case, the controlling shareholder improperly used
Rmb 368 million yuan belonging to Meierya, accounting for forty-one
percent of Meierya’s net assets. It does not appear from the report that
either the board of directors or the shareholders of Meierya authorized
the use of funds.
5.

Shanghai Jiabao Industrial (Group) Co. (“Jiabao”)

The CSRC investigated Jiabao in August 2000. Among other
violations of law uncovered by the CSRC, Jiabao engaged in illegal

122
Public Criticisms by the CSRC on Three and Nine Medical and Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. and
the Relevant Persons, (Aug. 21, 2001), available at http://www.chinainfobank.com.
123
COLLECTIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 779 (1998) (issuing the Guidelines of Articles of
Association of Listed Companies by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Dec.
16, 1997).
124
Public Criticisms by China Securities Regulatory Commission on Hubei Meierya Co. Ltd. and
the Relevant Persons of the Company, (September 20, 2001), available at http://www.chinainfo
bank.com.
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speculative trading of shares in other companies.125 The investigation
revealed that Jiabao injected Rmb 228 million yuan onto both the
primary market and the secondary market in Shanghai. As listed
companies are prohibited from speculative trading, Jiabao utilized more
than three hundred individual accounts to circumvent the ban from 1996
to 1998. 126 The illegal gain from the trading of shares in other companies
amounted to Rmb 840,000 yuan. Besides illegal trading of shares in
other companies, Jiabao also traded the shares of its own company by
using three accounts of different individuals. The investigation did not
discover any illegal gain from the trading of its own shares. In that case,
the CSRC imposed an administrative fine of Rmb fifty thousand yuan
upon the chairman of the board of directors, confiscated the illegal
trading gain of Rmb 840,000 yuan, and publicly criticized the directors of
Jiabao.
6.

Shandong Bohai Holding, Ltd. (“Bohai”)

Bohai was a case of manipulation of the company’s own shares.127
On August 1, 1994, senior officers of Bohai engaged in repeated trading
and false purchases and sales of shares of its own company without the
actual transfer of title of the shares. Like the previous cases, the senior
officers used the accounts in the name of four individuals. The price of
Bohai shares rose 102% as a result of the market manipulation. Bohai
spent Rmb 19.9 million yuan of its own funds purchasing 3,981,200 of its
own shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.128 Bohai eventually sold all
of these shares, and, together with 845,600 shares held before August 1,
Bohai had made a profit of Rmb 5.9 million yuan. 129 The CSRC
discovered numerous violations of the securities regulations by Bohai
and issued an official reprimand, confiscated the illegal profits, and
imposed a fine of Rmb one million yuan on the company and a fine of
Rmb fifty thousand yuan on Mr. Li Gang, the responsible officer.130

125
Penalty Decision of China Securities Regulatory Commission Concerning the Violation of
Securities Law and Regulation by Shanghai Jiabao Industrial (Group) Co. Ltd., CHINA SECURITIES
REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICIAL BULLETIN 36 (Oct. 8, 2000), available at
http://www.chinainfobank.com.
126
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
127
Philip Gregory, Securities Fraud in the PRC, CHINA L. & PRAC. 20, 21 (March 1995).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
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B. Implications of the Cases
These Chinese cases provide strong evidence that managers are not
working for the best interest of the residual claimants. In the case of
Hong Guang, managers cheated investors out of their money at the time
of listing by falsifying profit records.131 The strategy of using a false
profit record was also adopted by Energy 28 for the subsequent
distribution of shares after the company had become a listed company.132
The controlling shareholders’ abuses of the listing companies’ funds in
the cases of Sanjiu and Meierya shows a lack of consideration on the part
of controlling shareholders for the interest of minority shareholders.133
The Chinese way of vividly describing cheating of capital suppliers
by the insiders, such as managers and controlling shareholders, is
“quanqian,” or circling money. Using funds raised for improper
purposes on the stock market, such as in the case of Jiabao, provides
evidence that managers do not have good projects to efficiently use the
raised capital.134 Manipulating the shares of their own companies, in the
cases of Jiabao and Bohai, indicates that managers in these companies are
not using all their skills and efforts to discover net present value projects
or using existing assets effectively. 135 Such straightforward cases of
cheating their own shareholders are very unlikely to occur in
jurisdictions where minority shareholders are well protected.
The Chinese government has tried to eliminate the problem of soft
budget constraints by tightening the bank credit provided to SOEs. This
attempt has created problems for mismanaged SOEs. The use of the
stock market is expected to provide the necessary funds so that some
symbolicly-large, State-owned listed companies can survive, while being
subjected to some stock market disciplines. From an agency perspective,
when managers and directors in SOEs are not motivated to pursue the
clear goal of maximizing profit and are not subject to hard budget
constraints if their companies are efficiently run, they will seek personal
gains, as demonstrated in the above cases. The cases also reveal that the
political goal of maintaining some symbolicly-large, listed SOEs requires
the continuous supply of capital. In the past, the problem was that Stateowned banks could not tighten the credit on inefficient SOEs, but the

131
132
133
134
135
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current problem is that the government cannot tighten the supply of
capital on the stock market. If capital markets cannot penalize inefficient
SOEs because of political concerns, it is unlikely that corporate law and
securities regulations, including civil remedies, will be strictly enforced.
C. Weak Enforcement of Securities Regulation
Since the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990 and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991, the stock market in China has
developed relatively quickly.136 By the end of 2000, there had been 1,211
corporations listed domestically and internationally. 137 In December
2000, thirty percent of corporate capital was raised on the stock market
as compared with ten percent in 1993.138 The capitalization of the stock
market was fifty-seven percent of the gross domestic product,139 which is
very puzzling considering the weak protection of minority shareholders.
High savings rates and a lack of alternative investment channels explains
why the stock market in China can develop quickly when investors are
frequently cheated. Measured by the factor of whether corporations
assure a reasonable return to the suppliers of capital, the corporate
governance system in China requires considerable improvements.
The weak protection of minority shareholders is caused by several
factors. First, criminal prosecution is rarely instituted. The Company
Law140 and the Provisional Regulation on the Issuance and Trading of
Shares (“PRITS”)141 do not contain clear provisions on criminal liability
for misstatements in disclosure documents. However, the Decision on the
Punishment of Crimes in Violation of the Company Law142 provides that if a
company issues shares or corporate bonds with a falsified prospectus,
subscription forms, or corporate bond distribution documents, thereby
Han Zhiguo, The Development and Innovation of Shareholding Economy in China, PEOPLE
NET, (May 26, 2001), available at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn.
137
Wu Feng, Ten Questions Required Quick Solutions, PEOPLE NET, (September 22, 2001),
available at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn.
138
Fang Yuan, Zhou Xiaochuan: The Securities Market Has a Big Opera Next Year, PEOPLE
NET, (Dec. 29, 2000), available at http://www.people.com.cn.
139
See Wu Feng, supra note 137.
140
COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 456 (1993) (effective July 1, 1994), translated in
Company Law, CHINA L. & PRAC. 7, 20 (1994) (arts. 59, 51).
141
COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 480 (1993), translated in Securities Regulations,
supra note 118, at 23 (presenting the PRITS, which was issued by the State Council on April
22, 1993).
142
COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 51 (1994), available at http://isinolaw.com
(presenting the Decision, which was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress on February 28, 1995).
136
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raising huge amount of capital and causing serious consequences or
other serious events, the persons directly responsible will be sentenced
either for a term of less than five years or subject to a criminal penalty of
five percent of the amount raised, or the person will be subject to both
penalties.143 A similar provision was subsequently incorporated into the
1997 Criminal Act.144 Despite such a clear provision and numerous cases
of misrepresentation, the first case where criminal liability was imposed
on three directors did not occur until 2000.145
Second, the civil liability regime is not only poorly framed but also
weakly enforced. Compared with the relatively clear provisions on
criminal liability, there are only a few major provisions on civil liability.
Article 77 of PRITS stipulates that “anyone who violat[es PRITS and]
causes losses to others shall bear civil liability for compensation
according to law.”146 Since four types of misconduct are regulated by
PRITS,
covering
misrepresentation,
insider
trading,
market
manipulation, and fraud committed by securities intermediaries against
customers, it is very difficult for judges who are not sophisticated and do
not have law-making power to apply such a vague provision to deal
with civil liabilities when capital users or intermediaries deliberately or
negligently mislead investors through disclosure documents.147 Because
of this difficulty in applying Article 77 of PRITS, it has not been used to
hold any defendant civilly liable for misrepresentation. Likewise, the
Securities Law Article 63 provides the following:
If the prospectus, documents of offer of corporate bonds,
financial or accounting reports, listing documents,
annual reports, mid-term reports or ad hoc reports
distributed by the issuer or distributing securities
company contain a falsehood, misleading statement or
major omission and thereby causes investors to sustain
losses in the course of securities trading, the issuer or
distributing securities company shall be liable for
damages and the responsible directors, supervisors
and/or the managers of the issuer or distributing

Id. art. 3(1).
See CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PRC. art. 160 (1997).
145
See Penalty Decision Regarding the Violation of Securities Regulation by Chengdo Hong
Guang Industrial Ltd., supra note 115.
146
Securities Regulations, supra note 118, at 23, 42 (art. 77).
147
Id.
143
144
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securities company shall be jointly and severely liable
for damages.148
While Article 63 covers issuing companies and underwriters for both
negligent and fraudulent statements in these relevant disclosure
documents, Article 202 provides the grounds for civil liability in
connection
with
fraudulent
misstatements
produced
by
intermediaries.149 Article 202 provides, among other things, that “if a
professional organization that issues documents such as audit reports,
asset valuation reports or legal opinions for the issuance of or listing of
securities or securities trading activities” provides false certification and
causes losses to investors, the professional organization shall bear
liability. 150 There are at least two problems with Article 202. First,
fraudulent misrepresentation is difficult to prove in practice. A better
approach is to hold intermediaries liable based on negligent
misrepresentation. Second, there is no need to always hold the
intermediaries jointly liable—they can be independently liable for their
own negligence, particularly when the issuer has no fault.
Leaving aside the problems in Article 202, the civil liability for
negligent misrepresentation provided in Article 63 is relatively clear. By
the end of 2002, however, there had not been a single case where an
issuer bore civil liability despite the large number of cases of negligent or
fraudulent misrepresentation. In the Hong Guang case discussed
previously, the First Intermediate People’s Court of Chengdu in the
Province of Sichuan sentenced several directors to three-year
imprisonments or other criminal penalties.151 Investors in that case also
instituted civil actions, claiming damages for misrepresentation.152 The
District People’s Court of Pudong, however, did not accept their cases,
explaining that the cases did not fall within the scope of acceptance.153

COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 671 (1997), translated in Securities Laws, supra
note 66, at 37 (art. 63) (promulgated Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999).
149
Id. at 37 (art. 63), 64 (art. 202).
150
Securities Laws, supra note 66, at 64 (art. 202).
151
See Penalty Decision Regarding the Violation of Securities Regulation by Chengdo Hong
Guang Industrial Ltd., supra note 115.
152
The first person to bring a lawsuit was Jiang. Huang Xiangyuan, Hong Guang Qizha
An Mei Namo Rongyi Wanjie (The Case of Fraud of Hong Guang Could Not Easily Be Ended),
SEC. NEWSPAPER, (Dec. 28, 2000), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/24
/20001228/365000.html.
153
Id.
148
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Civil lawsuits were also instituted in several courts in the similar
case of Yin Guang Xia.154 Whereas many courts refused to accept cases of
misrepresentation, a court in Wuxi originally planned to entertain a
similar lawsuit.155 Shortly after the Wuxi court accepted the case, the
Supreme People’s Court instructed all courts not to accept civil cases
related to securities fraud, insider trading, and market manipulation.156
Upon receiving the Notice, the Wuxi Court suspended the treatment of
the case.
The Notice of the Supreme People’s Court invited a great deal of
criticism.157 Four months later, the Supreme People’s Court circulated
another notice to the lower courts, instructing them to accept civil suits
related to misrepresentation in disclosure documents. 158 In this
subsequent Notice, the Supreme People’s Court conditioned the
acceptance of civil lawsuits upon investigation and punishment of the
wrongdoer by the CSRC.159 Further, the Supreme People’s Court stated
that no class action should be allowed. 160 Although the Supreme
People’s Court subsequently issued a relatively detailed judicial opinion,
as of May 2004, there had been no court judgment requiring an issuer
with securities fraud to pay large sums of damages to a large number of
small investors.161
In addition to the weak enforcement of criminal and civil provisions,
lack of shareholders’ remedies is another factor contributing to the weak
corporate governance system in China. Neither the Company Law nor
154
Xue Li, Cong Hong Guang Dao Yin Guang Xia, Minishi Peichange De Lu You Duochang
(From Hong Guang Dao Yin Guang Xia, How Far We Still Have to Go for Civil Compensation),
SHANGHAI SEC. NEWSPAPER, (Sept. 6, 2001), available at http://finance-sina.com.cn.
155
Tao Feng, Cong Hong Guang Dao Yin Guang Xia Kan Gumin Weiquan (Look at the
Protection for Investors from Hong Guang to Yin Guang Xia), (Sept. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/36/20010928/571634.html.
156
Notice of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning the Temporary Non-Acceptance of
Securities Cases for Civil Compensation, (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.chinainfo
bank.com.
157
Ji Wenhai, Zhongguo Remmin Daxue Sanwei Jiaoshou Tan Zhengquan Weifa Ji Chengzhi
(Three Professors Talked about Violation of and Punishment for Illegal Acts on the Securities
Markets), CHINESE ECON. TIMES, (Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://www.chinainfobank.com.
158
Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Acceptance of Tort
Cases Involving Misrepresentation on the Securities Market, (January 15, 2002), available at
http://www.chinainfobank.com.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Trial of Civil Damages Cases Arising from Misrepresentation in the Securities Market Several
Provisions, CHINA L. & PRAC. 53 (2003) (issued by the Supreme People’s Court on Jan. 9,
2003, effective Feb. 1, 2003).
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the Securities Law contain any provision giving the shareholders the
right to bring derivative actions against corporate directors or managers
for their wrongful activities. Evidence in the United States “shows that
lawsuits are more common in firms more likely to need monitoring . . .
and that the probability of CEO turnover rises after a lawsuit is filed.”162
Japan’s experience is also helpful. According to Michael Gibson, the
Assistant Director of the Federal Reserve Board, “[i]n October 1993,
Japan’s Commercial Code was revised to reduce the fees required to file
a derivative lawsuit.”163 Since then, derivative lawsuits have increased
five times.164 These suits have heightened Japanese managers’ awareness
of their duties to corporations and their shareholders.165 Law reform in
China is also necessary in order to facilitate shareholder derivative
actions, particularly when most of the listing companies in China are
majority-controlled. Among the 1124 listed companies in April 2001,
seventy-nine percent were controlled by a shareholder who owned more
than fifty percent of the shares. 166 In sixty-five percent of the listed
companies, State shareholding dominated. 167 This level of control
further indicates that insiders control most of these listed companies.
Without the threat of derivative actions, the protection of minority
shareholder interests is unlikely.
Still another factor contributing to the weak protection of minority
shareholders is the low quality of certification by intermediaries. When
companies that raise capital cannot be trusted, third party certification
plays important roles in solving the adverse selection problem.168 Third
parties would include investment banks, accounting firms, and securities
counsel.169 The principal role of securities intermediaries is to vouch for
162
Michael Gibson, “Big Bang” Deregulation and Japanese Corporate Governance: A Survey of
the Issues, in CRISIS AND CHANGE IN THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 291, 305 (Takeo Hoshi
& Hugh Patrick eds., 2000) (citing PHILIP STRAHAN, SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL AGENCY PROBLEMS (Federal Reserve of New York,
Working Paper, 1998); see also The Federal Reserve Board, Michael S. Gibson, at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/research/staff/gibsonmichaels.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2005).
163
Gibson, supra note 162, at 305.
164
Curtis Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1188 (1998).
165
Id.
166
Wu Feng, supra note 137.
167
Id.
168
See George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty, and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
169
Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
UCLA L. REV. 781, 788 (2001).
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disclosure quality and thereby reduce information asymmetry in
securities markets.170 The system of third party certification works well,
however, only when the securities intermediaries are subject to
constraints. Some of the constraints include self-regulation, licensing
systems, civil liability to investors, and criminal liability.
The role of self-regulatory organizations in China is currently too
weak to curb serious securities fraud. However, the licensing system,
administered by the CSRC, works better in China. For securities
companies, including investment banks, a license from the CSRC is
required.171 Qualified accounting firms still need a license jointly issued
by the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance in order to do securities related
accounting.172 During the last several years, the CSRC has suspended
the licenses of and penalized many securities companies and accounting
firms. 173 Due to the limited resources of the CSRC, however, many
wrongdoers are unlikely to be caught. Under these circumstances,
criminal and civil liability are needed to deter false certification.
By the end of September 2002, there had not been a single case where
an accounting firm or underwriter had been subject to criminal liability.
As far as civil liability is concerned, holding accounting firms liable
requires fraudulent misrepresentation.174 Since it is difficult to prove the
intention of cheating, imposing civil liability on accounting firms will be
very difficult.
Although it is relatively easy to catch securities
underwriters committing negligent misrepresentation, or making
important omissions that give rise to civil liability, there is not a single
case where a securities underwriter has been sued. The logic is simple. If
issuers have rarely been held liable for the losses suffered by hundreds
of thousands of investors, how can securities underwriters be held civilly
liable for these losses? When securities intermediaries are not subject to
adequate constraints, the role of third party certification is considerably
weakened.
Id.
COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF PRC (1998) (arts. 117, 119) (enacted by the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress on Dec. 29, 1998), translated in Securities Law,
CHINA L. & PRAC. 25 (February 1999).
172
Notice Concerning the Qualification of Auditing Firms for Securities Business Issued by
China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State Administration of Auditing on March 23,
SELECTED SECURITIES LAWS AND REGULATIONS 893 (1993) (Shanghai University of Finance
and Economics, 2002) (arts. 2, 3).
173
The penalty decisions can be found in the Official Bulletin of China Securities
Regulatory Commission in various years.
174
Securities Laws, supra note 66, at 64 (art. 202).
170
171

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/3

Yu: Using Western Law to Improve China's State-Owned Enterprises: Of

2004]

China's State-Owned Enterprises

371

Part II of this Article has pointed out that China’s stock market and
the applicable laws were initially designed to improve the inefficient
SOEs.175 If at the time of enterprise reform various governments knew
that the SOEs were not efficiently managed and yet they urged these
enterprises to go to the stock market for capital, it is unlikely that
violations of imported, Western-type, securities regulations will be
heavily penalized. Strict enforcement of civil liability provisions is
inconsistent with the political goal of maintaining some symbolicly-large
SOEs in key sectors of the economy as many SOEs would be denied the
benefit of using the supply of capital on the stock and became bankrupt.
This explains the phenomenon of soft budget constraint on China’s
capital market. It also partly explains the weak enforcement of the law,
which is a cause of the defect of market institutions.
D. A Public Framework of Accountability
While recognizing the benefits of privatization, Professor Martha
Minow has also pointed out some concerns.176 One of the concerns is
that “privatization can undermine a value as basic as guarding against
the misuse of public funds.”177 According to Minow, “a shifting mix of
public and private providers of education, welfare, and prison services”
requires a system of public accountability:
Privatization of public services soared precisely when
major corporations engaged in unfettered private selfdealing and one major religious group reeled from
scandals, cover-ups, and mounting distrust among the
faithful. The coincidence in timing should be all the
reminder anyone needs of the vital role of public
oversight and checks and balances.178
Professors Trebilcock and Iacobucci have already pointed out the
fundamental problem with Minow’s article.179 Their view is that it is
inadequate to move “directly from making observations about flaws in

See supra Part II.
Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1129, 1249-55 (2003) (discussing privatization in the context of the U.S.
educational system).
177
Id. at 1247.
178
Id. at 1259-60.
179
See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 9, at 1422.
175
176
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private markets to drawing conclusions about the importance of
maintaining public sector influence in various settings.”180
The cases discussed in this section provide an interesting test
ground. If a public framework of accountability works well, such a
system should be relevant to Chinese SOEs in which governments are
heavily involved. In the context of China, a public framework of
accountability does not work well or cannot be easily established. As
most listed SOEs in China only provide non-public goods, it is
unnecessary to discuss in detail non-instrumental values like democracy,
equality, and pluralism.
Accountability in the public framework means being “answerable to
authority that can mandate desirable conduct and sanction conduct that
breaches identified obligations.” 181 More specifically, accountability
includes the use of contracts when working with private enterprises to
deliver social services. 182 At a minimum, “[a] public framework of
accountability for these activities would disclose the facts surrounding
the contracting process to the public.”183
The distribution of shares of SOEs in China involves (1) contractual
arrangements with intermediaries and (2) disclosure of underwriters and
the nature of the issuers. In order to issue shares to the public, issuers
are required to contract with accounting firms and securities companies,
both of which are mainly SOEs. When acting as securities underwriters,
“securities companies must examine the truthfulness, accuracy and
completeness of the public offer documents . . . . If they find that such
documents contain any falsehoods, misleading statements or major
omissions, they may not carry out the sales activities.”184 Issuers are also
required by contract to get accounting firm verification of the financial
and accounting reports of the company for the last three years. 185
Furthermore, issuers must disclose detailed information about
themselves to the CSRC and the public.186 Securities fraud in disclosing
false or misleading information to the public persists despite these
contractual arrangements and legal requirements.

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
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Minow’s second model of public accountability imposes
constitutional obligations on the government. 187 In the least, these
“constitutional values are meant to guard against self-dealing or other
conflicts of interest that arise when private parties are entrusted with
public duties.” 188 As part of the provisions of non-public goods or
services carried out by SOEs in China, various rules against self dealing
or other conflicts of interest are available. These rules include party
discipline and criminal and civil liability. Party rules require that
members of the Chinese Communist Party (“CPC”) shall not seek special
interests or privileges except within the scope of law or policy. 189
Violations of CPC rules may result in a warning, serious warning,
removal of position within the CPC, putting the violator onto a
monitoring list while keeping CPC membership, or expelling the violator
from the CPC.190 In a country always ruled by one party, the loss of
party membership is a significant and real burden. In addition, criminal
law penalizes misconduct of managers and directors related to bribery,191
competition with the company,192 and seeking self interest or interest for
friends. 193 Moreover, Company Law also prohibits or restricts selfdealing or conflicts of interest transactions.194 Despite all these rules,
connected transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries or
between associated companies of SOEs are very frequent, harming the
interest of minority shareholders. Statistics show that 84.6% of the listed
companies carried out connected transactions in 1997.195 While seeking
personal gains in conflicts of interest transactions will be heavily
penalized, connected transactions between associated companies of
SOEs rarely attract legal liability.196 This situation again shows the failure
of public accountability as it relates to public involvement in the
provision of goods and services in China.

Minow, supra note 176, at 1267.
Id. at 1268.
189
Zhong Guo Gong Chun Tong Zhang Cheng, Articles of Association of the Chinese
Communist Party, art. 2.
190
Id. (art. 39).
191
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 144, art. 163 (1997).
192
Id. art. 165.
193
Id. arts. 166, 168.
194
Company Law, CHINA L. & PRAC. 7 (March 1994) (arts. 59, 61).
195
Zhu Baoxian & Miu Haiying, A Preliminary Discussion of Connected Transactions in
Chinese Listed Companies, 18 ECON. MGMT. (2001), available at http://www.e521.com.
196
See, e.g., Kingsley T.W. Ong & Colin R. Baxter, A Comparative Study of the Fundamental
Elements of Chinese and English Company Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 88, 121 (1999).
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A third model of accountability advocated by Minow is
administration. 197 While it is not easy to specify the content of
administration, the term requires the collection of information so that
providers of goods or services can be properly chosen, assessed, and
monitored. 198 The case of China shows that Minow’s approach is
unlikely to succeed. To ensure the quality of the issuers and to control
development of the stock market, the Chinese Government specified a
quota for the distribution of shares by issuers in China in the early and
middle 1990s. 199 To get a quota, potential issuers had to apply to
provincial governments or ministries under the State Council for
approval. 200 The locally selected companies had to obtain further
approval from the CSRC, which also consulted the then State Economic
and Trade Commission and the State Development and Planning
Commission.201 Despite the heavy involvement of various government
agencies, abuse of the process was widespread as discussed in the early
part of this section.
The fourth legal model for public accountability advocated by
Minow is democracy. 202 According to Minow, “Democracy involves
both the processes and values committed to governance by the
people.” 203 Minow further asserts that “[d]isclosure of relevant
information, accompanied by periodic occasions for the expression of
public views on [certain] decisions and the standards set and used to
assess them, would” enhance democratic values. 204 While China has
never adopted any Western democratic form of government, the concept
and system of socialism reflects a value of rule by the people. In a rigid
socialist country, the means of production were all in the hands of the
State. Employees or people in general were the masters of enterprises
and the country. Rational passivity and free rider problems, however,
led people to the direction of irresponsibility. The vehicle of SOEs was
originally intended to better serve the people who were the residual

Minow, supra note 176, at 1268.
Id.
199
CSRC, The CSRC Notice of Opinions on the Administration of Certain Issues Concerning the
Issuing of Shares (Oct 24, 1995), available at http://www.chinainfobank.com (providing brief
information on the quota system).
200
Checking and Approval Procedure of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on the
Issuing of Shares, § 1, at 177, COLLECTION OF SEC. L. AND REGS. (Mar. 16, 2000).
201
Id. § 2.
202
Minow, supra note 176, at 1268-69.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 1269.
197
198

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/3

Yu: Using Western Law to Improve China's State-Owned Enterprises: Of

2004]

China's State-Owned Enterprises

375

claimants of SOEs. The reality, however, did not properly reflect the
socialist ideal.
Widespread securities fraud in China’s listed SOEs reveals the
failure of the system of public accountability. It is puzzling why a public
framework of accountability along the line advocated by Minow does
not work in China or cannot be developed to better deal with the waste
of public resources in SOEs. Trebilcock and Iacobucci doubt whether
public accountability mechanisms work to discipline public actors. 205
They conclude that the features that undermine the market often
undermine public provision of goods or services as well.206
If a public framework of accountability does not work well in the
case of public provision of goods by using the vehicle of SOEs, it is
doubtful whether such a public framework works to discipline private
actors. At least, “the imposition of legal accountability or other
constraints on the private sector may entail costs in terms of reduced
competition, innovation, and flexibility, which may negate any
advantages of private sector over public sector provision.”207
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article uses the example of takeovers and securities fraud to
examine why the imported, Western-style of takeover law or securities
regulation cannot be fully enforced in China. The political goal of
maintaining the control of a large number of State-owned listed
companies appears to be a significant contributing factor to why China
cannot fully utilize the benefits of Western law in the establishment of a
market-oriented economy. If China wants to successfully compete in a
globalized economy, the Chinese government has to seriously consider
the issue of whether it should withdraw or considerably reduce the
ownership in the large number of State-owned listed companies. The
two examples can be extended to other areas to show that the
institutional defects in State-owned companies do not provide adequate
means to motivate managers and directors in these companies to work
for the best interest of their companies or adequate means to discipline
the managers and directors if they do not work for the best interest of the
companies they serve. During the transition from a planned economy to
a market-oriented economy, corporate governance matters, particularly
205
206
207

Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 9, at 1448.
Id. at 1436.
Id. at 1451.
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after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, within which
China has to compete with other developed nations under similar
background rules.
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